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ABSTRACT 
The use of unmanned systems in the military has been growing. Although the 
technologies and associated capabilities of unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) 
continue to progress rapidly, comparatively little has been considered about how these 
systems will impact a future operating environment. This thesis used scenario planning, 
specifically a slice-of-time scenario planning, to explore the future operating environment 
and examined integrating UAS into the current manned environment. This thesis 
highlighted a few technologies which will shape the future of unmanned systems. The 
thesis also explored a case study based on STARFISH Project by the Acoustic Research 
Laboratory (ARL), a laboratory within the Tropical Marine Science Institute (TMSI) of 
the National University of Singapore (NUS), and derived a proposed roadmap for 
integrating unmanned systems into the manned environment. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
While the technologies and associated capabilities of unmanned autonomous systems 
(UAS) continue to progress rapidly, comparatively little is known about how these 
systems will impact a future operating environment. This is premised on the fact that the 
unmanned systems are new and for which there is little experience. It is also premised on 
the fact that the human controllers do not yet know the limitations and capabilities of the 
unmanned systems. This thesis aims to highlight the implications of integrating UAS into 
the manned environment and to gain insights into desired command and control (C&C) 
structures. 
The research applied the approach of scenario building based on the “slice-of-
time” method in order to answer the research questions with “slice-of-time” scenario 
building. This scenario building examined the UAS in a future slice-of-time and explored 
the desirable characteristic of the UAS in a fully autonomous environment. This thesis 
highlighted a few technologies that will shape the future of unmanned systems.  
The author’s work focused on the first two phases, (1) Concept and Technology 
Development, and (2) System Development and Demonstration of the United States 
Acquisition Process. The thesis also explored a case study based on the STARFISH 
Project by the Acoustic Research Laboratory (ARL), a laboratory within the Tropical 
Marine Science Institute (TMSI) of the National University of Singapore (NUS). It also 
examined a timeline in which a real-life unmanned system conducted the required 
Concept and Technology Development and System Development and Demonstration. 
Using the case study and understanding of the acquisition process resulted in a proposed 
roadmap for integrating unmanned systems into a manned environment. 
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The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) completed a naval exercise on May 15, 
2012, which involved integrated operations between the Formidable-class frigate and the 
frigate’s organic naval helicopters, as well as a multi-dimensional exercise encompassing 
anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. More importantly, the recently 
upgraded Victory-class missile corvette (MCV) demonstrated the use of the MCV’s 
organic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), ScanEagle UAV (S. Tan 2012). However, this 
was not the first time that the RSN had operated with an unmanned system. 
The RSN earlier operated with the Protector, an Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
(USV) during the RSN’s RSS Resolution’s (Endurance-class Landing Ship Tank) three-
month deployment to the North Arabian Gulf in 2004 (Wan 2007). The Protector USV 
was used during that deployment to assist in the mission of protecting critical 
installations from terrorist attacks. This was achieved by the USV intercepting boats and 
instructing them away from the critical installations. The boats complied even when there 
was no man aboard the USV. 
The naval exercise on May 15, 2012 underscored the exciting, changing time that 
has dawned upon the RSN by integrating unmanned systems. The Minister of Defence 
(Singapore) highlighted this integration into a single system in his interview with the 
press during the naval exercise quoted in the following:  
The general point about our (Singapore) Army, Navy and Air Force is that 
now we’re fighting as a system, rather than as individual compartments, 
and that makes us very much more effective. (Dr. Ng [Minister of 
Defence, Singapore] 2012) 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While the technologies and associated capabilities of unmanned autonomous 
systems (UAS) continue to progress rapidly, comparatively little is known about how 
these systems will impact a future operating environment. This is premised on the fact 
that the unmanned systems are new so there is little experience. It is also premised on the 
fact that human controllers do not yet know the limitations and capabilities of the 
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unmanned systems. Similarly, integrating autonomous systems into existing 
organizational structures and Command and Control (C&C) architectures has not been 
explored. This thesis aims to highlight the implications of integrating UAS into the 
manned environment and gain insights into desired C&C structures. Thus, this research 
will seek to answer the following questions: 
 How to integrate unmanned systems onto existing platforms? 
 How should unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) be integrated into a 
manned environment given the potential differences in the Command and 
Control (C&C) structures? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The traditional way of planning for an improvement in capabilities is taking an 
existing platform with its old capability and integrating a new capability. An example of 
this is that which was introduced in the opening paragraph of RSN integrating the 
ScanEagle UAV capability onto the existing Victory-class MCV. This method of 
improving capability of an existing system is incremental in nature with a high level of 
confidence for success as there is little risk in taking small steps. This traditional way of 
planning, however, leads to the inevitable problem of having to make compromises. 
Compromises such as in the earlier example of RSN’s integrating ScanEagle UAV, the 
Victory-class has lost its anti-submarine sonar capability. There have also been comprises 
on the radar signature of the ship as there are more structures on board the top deck 
(Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) Singapore 2012). The alternative to integrating a new 
element is to design a new system from an empty slate and not having to deal with 
compromise. Otherwise, in order to integrate, trade spaces are examined and explored to 
choose the most efficient solution in terms of operationalizing the new capability in the 
shortest time on an existing platform 
This research applied the approach of scenario building based on the “slice-of-
time” method and will seek to answer the research questions with “slice-of-time” 
scenario building. This scenario building will examine the UAS in a future slice-of-time 
and explore the desirable characteristic of the UAS in a fully autonomous environment. 
The C&C structure was explored in this future slice-of-time. This thesis focused on the 
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first two phases of Concept and Technology Development and System Development and 
Demonstration. Using a real life unmanned system as a case study, this thesis examined 
the timeline that a real-life unmanned system has taken to conduct the Concept and 
Technology Development and System Development and Demonstration. A comparison 
was made on the existing C&C structures of traditional incremental planning and 
implications highlighted to make recommendations for the continual effort of integrating 
UAS into the current manned environment.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I provided background along with the 
scope and methodology used. Chapter II described the literature review into different 
scenario planning, technological improvement and Command and Control. Chapter III 
introduced a case study. Chapter IV described in detail the slice-of-time scenario that is 
used for analysis in this thesis and established the necessary environmental assumptions 
used as well as developed the slice-of-time scenario. Chapter V provided conclusion and 
recommendations for future research. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the rationale and overview of the thesis as well as its scope, 
benefits, and research methodology. 
 4
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SLICE-OF-TIME SCENARIO 
Chapter II describes in detail the slice-of-time scenario method that is used for 
analysis in this thesis. 
B. SCENARIO PLANNING 
Organizational change occurs all the time in different magnitudes. In Chapter I, 
this thesis introduced the naval exercise carried out by the Singapore Navy which is an 
example of an organizational change. A study into such organizational change is difficult 
as the environmental contexts in which the organizations exist are themselves also 
changing. The environmental context change often occurs at an increasing rate and is of 
increasing complexity. An example of this is the increased complexity in software needed 
to support hardware in the Typhoon Eurofighter aircraft (Eurofighter n.d.). The aircraft is 
aerodynamically unstable and is unable to be flown by humans without a computer 
controlling the aircraft’s stability. This environment context changed from one that 
involved only hardware to an environment that will need software to drive hardware. 
Therefore, the uncertainty in a study into organizational change or for a decision-maker 
in strategic planning is compounded by an increasingly dynamic and uncertain 
environment (Emery and Trist 1965). 
Scenario planning is a useful tool in strategic planning and is beneficial in 
simplifying the complexity in environmental context change. The complex environment 
context can be isolated in scenario planning with a simpler context and understanding of 
a simpler causal relationship. Scenario planning is not new and has been in use for 
several decades. Large complex organizations have used scenario planning as a 
disciplined method for imagining the possible futures events, such as Shell International 
Petroleum Company (Royal Dutch/Shell Group, in the Netherlands) since the early 1970s 
before the 1973 Oil Shock (Schoemaker and van der Heijden 1993). In the mid-1980s, 
Shell created scenarios that focused on the future of the Soviet Union because that 
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country was a major competitor in the European gas market. That planning was used as 
part of the process to generate and evaluate the Shell’s strategic options (Schoemaker and 
van der Heijden 1993). 
1. Scenario Planning Differs From Other Planning Methods 
Scenario planning differs from other types of planning methods. Schoemaker has 
highlighted the differences in scenario planning when compared to three other types of 
planning methods: (1) contingency planning, (2) sensitivity analysis and (3) computer 
simulations (P. J. Schoemaker 1995). 
First, contingency planning is more focused on one specific uncertainty, such as 
“What if the engine of the ScanEagle1 stopped working, will the ScanEagle be able to 
safely glide on a landing path?” Contingency planning presents a base case and the 
exception or contingency. Scenario planning is more holistic in consideration. Scenario 
planning explores the joint impact of various uncertainties. It considers holistically the 
joint impact of various uncertainties giving them equal weightage in determining the 
follow up action plan for these uncertainties. 
Second, sensitivity analysis examines the effect of a specific change of one 
variable while keeping all other variables constant. This is a very systematic and 
scientific method of observing the response of a system to a specific variable of interest 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2010). As the name suggests, sensitivity analysis makes is 
appropriate for small changes in one variation, while the remaining variations stay 
constant. Sensitivity analysis does not make sense when change is large (Daradkeh, 
Churcher and McKinnon 2008). Often a large change in one variation will affect other 
variations making them difficult to remain constant. An example is examining the flying 
characteristic of the ScanEagle in different atmospheric temperatures. If the variation in 
atmospheric temperature is small, sensitivity analysis of atmospheric temperature to the 
stalling angle of can be conducted. However, if the variation of atmospheric temperature 
is large, air pressure will be affected. This may also result in different wind speed if there 
                                                 
1 ScanEagle (SE) is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) built by Insitu, a subsidiary of Boeing. 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2012/may/15may12_nr/15may12_fs3.html 
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is a large change in atmospheric temperature (Eastern Illinois University n.d.). Sensitivity 
analysis is not of much value then. Scenarios instead “try to capture the new states that 
will develop after major shocks or deviations in key variables” (P. J. Schoemaker 1995). 
Third, scenarios are more than just the output of a complex computer simulation 
model. Scenarios instead attempt to interpret output by identifying patterns and clusters 
the many computer simulations might generate. Scenario planning often includes 
elements that are subjective and which can be difficult to be objectively represented in 
computer simulations. “Scenario planning simplifies the avalanche of data into a limited 
number of possible states.” (P. J. Schoemaker 1995) 
2. Purpose of Scenario Planning 
The purpose of using scenarios is to give a credible context in which to explore 
options in a particular scenario’s context. When two or more scenarios are thought out, 
comparison and contrast can be done on the alternatives. The objective of the scenario is 
to project an analytical schema from which alternatives can be extrapolated, compared 
and contrasted. It is not employed for figuring out different plans that can be used when 
different scenarios unfold, but provides this analytical schema so that specific important 
causal factors and interactions can be investigated in greater detail. Scenario planning 
will be able to reveal potential consequences “that are often overlooked in general or 
abstract analyses and discussions” (Kahn and Wiener 1967). Simply put, scenarios are 
“tools for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative future environments, in which 
one’s decisions might be played out” (Schwartz 1991). 
Peter Schwartz describes several steps in the scenario development process in his 
work, The Art of the Long View. These steps include: identify the focal issue or decision; 
identify the key forces and trends in the environment; rank the driving forces and trends 
by importance and uncertainty; select the scenario logics; fill out the scenarios; assess the 
implications; and select the leading indicators and signposts for monitoring purposes 
(Schwartz 1991, 226–234). 
The similarities in the steps for developing scenarios, as described by Morrison 
and Mecca, are that they are narrative descriptions of possible futures. A single scenario 
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represents a history of the future. There may be many different paths that can lead to this 
future, and a single scenario is but one of the histories of this future (Morrison and Mecca 
2003). Morrison and Mecca comprehensively described the various steps to be taken into 
consideration in developing scenarios. An example is the scenario of the “most likely” 
future. This scenario contains all of the forecasts (developed from an earlier forecasting 
activity) in a narrative, weaving them together from some point in the future, describing 
the history of how they unfolded. In this manner, the scenario will encompass the logic 
for setting the contexts of forecast future. Alternatives to this future are based upon the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of particular events in the event set. The range of 
uncertainty inherent in the different scenarios (which are, themselves, forecasts) changes 
the assumption that the future will be an extrapolation from the past (Morrison and 
Mecca 2003). Within the context of an alternative future depicted by a scenario, the 
decision-maker can identify causal relationships between environmental forces, the 
probable impacts of these forces on the organization, the key decision points for possible 
intervention, and foundations of appropriate strategies (Kahn and Wiener 1967); (Martino 
1993). By providing a realistic range of possibilities, the set of alternative scenarios 
facilitates the identification of common features likely to have an impact on the 
organization no matter which alternative occurs. 
Therefore, the purpose of scenarios is not to produce an accurate picture of the 
intended operational environment. Of course, if one is able to do so, it will be an added 
benefit. Instead, scenarios help stakeholders make strategic decisions about the 
stakeholders’ future, collaborate together and orient the stakeholders’ action as necessary 
as they discover from the context created by the scenarios. The focus for the stakeholders 
is to understand the causal relationships between the environmental forces and identify 
the main driving forces and the areas of uncertainty. In summary, scenarios communicate 
ideas, clarify relationships, and describe the alternative outcomes of the dynamics of a 
system. 
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3. Types of Scenarios 
There are many approaches that can be taken in writing scenarios. These range 
from as simple as a single person writing a description of a future situation to as 
complicated as using an interactive computer model to generate outlines of many 
alternatives. Morrison and Mecca described that there are four distinct types of scenarios: 
 demonstration scenario 
 driving-force scenario 
 system-change scenario 
 slice-of-time scenario 
The first three types are characteristic of “path-through-time” narratives; the 
fourth is a “slice of time” narrative. This thesis will examine the four different types of 
scenario in detail in the following sections (Morrison and Mecca 2003). 
a. Demonstration Scenario 
Herman Kahn, Harvey DeVeerd, and a few others at RAND (Research 
And Development) Corporation were the first to pioneer the demonstration scenario. A 
non-profit global policy think tank, RAND was first formed to offer research and analysis 
to the United States armed forces by Douglas Aircraft Company in the early days of 
systems analysis (RAND Corporation 2011). 
In a demonstration scenario, the writer first imagines a particular end-
state, in the future, and then describes a distinct and plausible path of events that could 
lead to that end-state. There is another version of the demonstration scenario in which it 
considers branch-points. Branch-points are decisive events for which crucial choices are 
made along the plausible path of events that it represents. These branch-points are the 
focus of the policy attentions and not the final outcome (or the end-state that was first 
imagined starting out the demonstration scenario process). As Kahn and Wiener point 
out, demonstration scenarios answer two kinds of questions: (a) how might some 
hypothetical situation come about, step by step, and (b) what alternatives exist at each 
step for preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process? (Kahn and Wiener 1967) 
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A demonstration scenario is useful in both stimulating and disciplining the 
imagination. It is much like the usefulness of the other three scenario types as described 
in the following sections. The major weakness of the demonstration scenario, as Morrison 
and Mecca highlight, is that it is based upon “genius’’ forecasting or experts’ opinions, 
and is, therefore, dependent upon the idiosyncrasies and experiences of individuals 
(Morrison and Mecca 2003). 
b. Driving-Force Scenario 
The driving-force scenario is a popular type of scenario in governmental 
and business planning as exemplified by Schwartz (Schwartz 1991). The writer first 
devises a “scenario space” by identifying a set of key trends, specifying at least two 
distinctly different levels of each trend, and developing a matrix that inter-relates each 
trend at each level with the others. For example, two driving forces are GNP growth and 
population growth. If each driving force is set to “high,” “medium,” and ‘‘low,’’ there are 
nine possible combinations which define the scenario space and the context of a possible 
future. The writer’s task is to describe each of these futures, while assuming the driving-
force trends remain constant. 
The purpose of the driving-force scenario is to clarify the nature of the 
future by contrasting alternative futures with others in the same scenario space. It may 
well be that certain policies would fare equally well in most of the futures, or that certain 
futures may pose problems for the institution. In the latter case, decision-makers will 
know where to direct their monitoring efforts. 
The key usefulness of driving-force scenario is that the analysis of 
strategic choice is simplified to a function of considerable value (e.g., “high,” “medium,” 
and ‘‘low”). This takes place at the beginning of conducting the analysis when the search 
for key variables is most perplexing among the vast possibilities of variables. 
Simplification is at the key of this driving-force scenario. The major weakness of the 
driving-force scenario is the assumption that the trend levels are fixed. This assumption 
ignores all the potential events that might affect the trend. It is akin to turning a deaf ear 
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to a traffic warning of congestion when choosing a driving route home. The experience 
one gets from the selected route may not be reflective of the route’s normal condition.  
c. System-Change Scenario 
The system-change scenario is designed to explore systematically, 
comprehensively, and consistently the interrelationships and implications of a set of trend 
and event forecasts. This set, may be developed through scanning. Scanning is the 
systematic collection of external environmental information in order to lessen the 
randomness of information received by an organization. It is providing context or trend 
evaluation to information. This set of trend and event forecasts embraces the full range of 
concerns in the social, technological, economic and political environments. Thus, system-
change scenario type varies both from the demonstration scenario (which leads to a single 
outcome and ignores most or all of the other developments contemporaneous with it) and 
from the driving-force scenario (which accounts for a full range of future developments 
but assumes that the driving trends are unchanging), in that there is no single event that 
caps the scenario, and there are no a priori driving forces. 
The system-change scenario depends upon cross-impact analysis to 
develop the outline of alternative futures. The writer must still use a good deal of 
creativity to make each alternative intriguing by highlighting key branch points and 
elaborating on critical causal relationships. Cross-impact analysis of events from the 
various scenarios also defines the upper and lower envelopes of each trend projection. 
The system-change scenario’s major weakness is the same criticism that 
can be applied to driving-force and demonstration scenarios: all of the input data and 
relationships are judgmental. There is a great deal of subjectivity and experts’ opinion to 
these scenarios. Another weakness is that the envelopes that bound the trend projection 
by itself provide no guidance in deciding which of the many alternative futures that can 
be generated should serve as the basis for writing scenarios. This choice must be made 
using such criteria as “interest,” “plausibility,” or “relevance” (Morrison and Mecca 
2003). 
 12
d. Slice-of-Time Scenario 
A slice-of-time scenario jumps to a future period in which a set of 
conditions comes to fruition, and then describes how stakeholders think, feel, and behave 
in that environment. The objective of slice-of-time scenario is to summarize a perception 
about the future or to show that the future may be more (or less) desirable, fearful, or 
attainable than is currently generally thought (Morrison and Mecca 2003). If period 
within “slice-of-time” is wide, say from 1990 to the year 2000, it is possible to identify 
the macro-trends over this period (Naisbitt 1990). The strength of this approach is the 
narrow temporal focus with the pretense of an attached reference to time. This is a typical 
dimension in which people often think. The weakness of this approach is there is no 
explanation as to the influences on the direction of these trends, no plausible description 
of how (and why) the influences change over time. 
C. TECHNOLOGY THAT SHAPED THE FUTURE UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
1. DARPA Competition 
The ongoing efforts to allow UAVs to exist in a manned environment will be 
shown. A relatively complex urban environment is similar in many ways to the maritime 
environment of congested straits. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) Grand Challenges is a prize competition for driverless vehicles, funded by the 
DARPA. These Grand Challenges started in 2005 with unmanned cars driving through 
deserts and then in 2007 the Urban Challenge competition attempted navigation through a 
mock urban environment (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
2007). The DARPA Grand Challenge evolved to unmanned cars interacting in a mock 
urban environment as shown in Figure 1. This series of competitions has shown it is 
possible to allow for autonomous vehicles to co-exist in a manned environment. It is very 
plausible that in the near future some autonomous vehicles will exist in a maritime 
environment, too.  
 13
 
Figure 1.  DARPA Urban Challenge Viewed Synthesized from the Car’s Laser Scanner 
(From Greenberg 2007) 
Google Company had embarked on the Google Car Project since the DARPA 
Grand Challenge and has reported that its automated cars, manned by trained operators 
(mainly for safety reason as the car are more than capable of driving through the manned 
environment without any operator intervention), have driven from the Google company’s 
Mountain View campus to its Santa Monica office. The automated car has gone on to 
Hollywood Boulevard, down Lombard Street, crossed the Golden Gate Bridge, navigated 
the Pacific Coast Highway, and traveled all the way around Lake Tahoe. The self-driving 
cars have logged over 140,000 miles since October 9, 2010 (Google 2010) pictured here 
in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  Google Car (From Google 2010) 
2. True Force Multiplier 
Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) are a true force multiplier. The resources 
and efforts that are poured into enabling a single unmanned autonomous vehicle to 
perform a particular task need only be invested once. The single vehicle that has learnt to 
carry out its task can be easily scaled up and replicated in an entire swarm of UAS. This 
scaling up can enable an entire swarm of UAS to carry out incredible missions which can 
also be seen as an emergent property of a swarm of UAS. Seeing what the researchers at 
The General Robotics, Automation, Sensing and Perception (GRASP) Laboratory, 
University of Pennsylvania (Engineering) have achieved with a swarm of flying mini 
flying quadrotors, the future of swarm UAS is inspired (GRASP Laboratory 2012). A still 
photo of a flying demonstration from KMel Robotics, (maker of the quadrotors) during 
The Saatchi & Saatchi New Directors’ Showcase 2012 at Cannes Lions International 
Festival of Creativity on 17–23 June 2012, is shown in Figure 3. This illustrates some of 
the many different emergent properties from a swarm of flying mini flying quadrotors 
and efforts put in put the many different producers and designers. 
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Figure 3.  Swarm of quadrotors showcasing their emergent properties (From KMel 
Robotics 2012)  
3. Nanotube-Reinforced Carbon Fiber Piranha USV 
A ZPM’s nanotube-reinforced carbon fiber prepreg (already impregnated with a 
synthetic resin) is normally associated with high-performance composite powerboats. The 
use of such ultra-lightweight materials in an unmanned surface vessel (USV) makes sense 
as this will increase USV endurance allowing it to remain in the operation area for a 
longer period therefore making them deployable in more situations. Built entirely of 
Arovex™, the newly announced 54-foot Piranha USV weighs only 8,000 pounds, yet can 
carry a 15,000 pound payload 2,500 miles. The high weight to carrying capacity makes 
the platform suitable for missions as diverse as anti-piracy, search and rescue, submarine 
hunting, and harbor patrol with a range of armament options that includes stabilized 
machine guns, Mark 54 torpedoes, and over-the-horizon missiles. 
Future versions will leverage the Piranha USV’s reconfigurable payload capacity 
for a wide range of missions, including anti-piracy, surface surveillance, surface action, 
mine countermeasures, electronic warfare, and antisubmarine warfare. 
The Piranha USV provides real opportunity to use unmanned vessels as a 
true force multiplier,” said Russell Belden, VP Advanced Composite 
Solutions and Director of the Piranha USV Program at ZPM (Zyvex 
Marine 2011). It is designed to perform a wide variety of missions like 
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anti-piracy, search and rescue, submarine hunting, and harbor patrol. Since 
the Piranha is an unmanned surface vessel, it will reduce the risk to the 
warfighter and provide greater capability for those missions at a 
dramatically lower cost. This craft provides real opportunity to use 
unmanned vessels as a true force multiplier. 
The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are facing a looming budgetary crisis 
with little relief in sight,” said James Hasik, principal at Hasik Analytic, a 
defense industry consulting firm that has been working with ZPM to refine 
the USV’s operational concept and marketability to military customers 
(Zyvex Marine 2011). “A cost-effective unmanned vessel like the Piranha, 
with its range and payload, could provide the numbers and capabilities to 
significantly augment the current fleets, and help to control the seas from 
the Caribbean to the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of 
Africa. 
In particular, the Piranha USV could be a very useful tool for combating modern 
piracy. Capable of cruising long distances to escort single ships or convoys, it can use 
advanced sensors and networked satellite or terrestrial communications to be able to 
provide continuous persistent presence to detect pirates or other hostiles before they can 
threaten shipping. 
Surface navies have been clamoring for unmanned systems that can truly 
deliver useful capabilities,” said Lance Criscuolo, president of ZPM 
(Zyvex Marine 2011). “The Piranha USV offers the U.S. and its allies the 
platform they need to bring the advances in unmanned aerial systems from 
the sky to the water. ZPM has a history of developing materials for lighter, 
more efficient products. We’re very proud to apply this knowledge and 
offer a USV to keep the waters safe and our sailors out of harm’s way. 
Construction of a Piranha USV prototype is underway, and was to begin sea trials 
in the second quarter of 2010. In 2011, Zyvex Marine shipped the first production nano-
composite vessel (Zyvex Marine 2011).  
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Figure 4.  Zyvex Marine’s Piranha USV (Zyvex Marine 2011) 
4. Pyros Small Tactical Munitions 
Raytheon’s new Pyros small tactical munitions went to an end-to-end live firing 
test on July 18, 2012 (Raytheon Company 2012). A single Pyros was dropped from a 
Cobra unmanned air vehicle (UAV) to demonstrate the glide bomb’s semi-active laser 
and Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance modes, its height-of-burst sensor for 
standoff detonation above a target and the multi-effects warhead. These can be seen from 
the company’s live firing video shown on their website (Raytheon Company 2012). 
The live firing simulated targeting simulated insurgents planting an improvised 
explosive device. While directly over the target, the warhead detonated at a 
predetermined height following inputs from the weapon’s height-of-burst sensor. The 
Pyros is a gravity-dropped bomb that is guided to dead center of the target. It is then 
detonated at a preset height over the target to permanently terminate the threat. 
At 13.5 pounds (6.1 kg) in weight, 22 inches (56 cm) in length, and 3.6 inches (9 
cm) in diameter, Pyros is the smallest air-launched weapon in the Raytheon portfolio – 
small enough to be dropped from the U.S. military’s common launch tube. 
Originally sporting a seven-pound (3.2 kg) warhead, Raytheon says the new 
warhead removed two pounds (0.9 kg) of weight while providing improved blast-
fragment characteristics (Raytheon Company 2012). Costing in the neighborhood of 
U.S.$35K per unit, Pyros is built for delivery via UAV, but is also well suited for light 
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attack aircraft such as the Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B, which could carry dozens of Pyros 
small tactical munitions (STMs) on missions. 
Having a wingspan of 10.2 feet (3.1 m), a length of 9.3 feet (2.8 m), and a takeoff 
weight over 100 pounds (45 kg), the Raytheon Cobra is about one-third the size of the 
better known General Atomics MQ-1 Predator and could easily be mistaken for a “giant-
scale” radio controlled model airplane, some of which have wingspreads greater than 20 
feet (6.1 m) and weigh well over two hundred pounds (91 kg) (Raytheon Company 
2012). 
In fact, the Cobra’s single engine is a Desert Aircraft DA-150 air-cooled, two-
cycle, two-cylinder power plant, designed for giant-scale model planes, which produces 
16.5 horsepower from just over nine cubic inches (150 cc) displacement, and weighs 
eight pounds (3.6 kg).  
 
 
Figure 5.  Pyros being fitted onto a Cobra unmanned air vehicle (Raytheon Company 
2012) 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C&C) 
1. Differences in Command and Control 
In order to better understand Command and Control, consider the functions “to 
command” and “to control,” and conduct a functional decomposition of them. The 
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decomposed process of “to command” (or “to direct”) is shown in Figure 6. In the case of 
the other decomposed processes “to control” is shown in Figure 7. From the figures, the 
differences between command and control can be seen from the decomposed 
subprocesses. Therefore, when considering a C&C architecture for unmanned systems, it 
is similar to integrating a system. If the integrating of the system is predicated on 
commanding and directing (or controlling), it is essential to separate the functions so that 
the proper allocation can be made to physical entities and so the users of the system can 
be exposed to the most effective functions to carry out their work (Langford, Engineering 
Systems Integration, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Decomposition of “To Command” Process (From Langford,  Engineering 




Figure 7.  Decomposition of “To Control” Process (From Langford, Engineering 
Systems Integration, 2012) 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In order to have a different analysis of how unmanned autonomous systems 
(UAS) can be integrated into manned environments, this chapter suggests using a slice-
of-time scenario to project a future period where the environment will be that systems are 
unmanned and autonomous. In this scenario space, the question of integrating man into 
such an environment can be examined, and determination made if such future integration 
is attainable. This chapter also introduced some of the technologies that affect unmanned 
systems and their integration space into the manned environment. This chapter also 
looked into the difference in command and control. The following chapters will examine 
this possibility in details. 
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III. CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Oftentimes, lessons from previous projects (referred to as cases) can be 
assembled and reviewed to glean lessons. In developing an appreciation 
for how certain aspects of these projects seemed to affect or be affected, 
the power of hindsight is often too critical of the progress from one stage 
to the next. By the knowledge of the results of the project work or by 
ignorance of what actually transpired, lessons taken from these cases can 
be extracted and applied to similar, representative examples of current 
work studied. After a bit of review and introspection, patterns of behavior 
or events may develop that suggest a commonly occurring set of variables 
and outcomes. At some point, a behavioral model might be constructed 
that represents a more detailed examination of a portion of the lessons, 
grounded in a set of perspectives, measurement theory, and the objective 
actions. We refer to such a set as a case study. (Langford, Engineering 
Systems Integration, 2012) 
Given the understanding of extracting lessons from case studies, this thesis will 
look at an unmanned system in development. With review, and observation for patterns 
of events, the objective is to piece together the probable timeline involved in the 
development of a real life unmanned system to aid in the projection of a roadmap for 
development of a fully autonomous unmanned system that will be integrated into a 
manned environment. 
B. STARFISH: AN OPEN-ARCHITECTURE AUTONOMOUS 
UNDERWATER VEHICLES (AUV) 
STARFISH is the name given to a small team of autonomous robotic fish - a 
project carried out by the Acoustic Research Laboratory (ARL), a laboratory within the 
Tropical Marine Science Institute (TMSI) of the National University of Singapore (NUS). 
The aim of the STARFISH project is to develop a team of modular, low-cost 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) with a design that supports extensions to 
allow adding heterogeneous capabilities. The STARFISH project was started in 2006 as 
shown in Figure 8. The STARFISH AUVs have been designed with an open-architecture 
framework of mechanical, electrical and software interfaces. This modularity allows the 
users to easily reconfigure a team of AUVs according to field requirements. STARFISH 
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is not a single AUV, but a team of modular and cost efficient open-architecture AUVs. 
With these multiple base AUVs, users may easily configure heterogeneous teams of 
AUVs for collaborative missions. Users can also easily integrate their proprietary 
modules with other AUVs. Integration is not bound by hardware modules, but is 
extended to software subsystems that can be inserted and swapped within the vehicles. 
This grants the users flexibility to control and reconfigure a heterogeneous team of 
specialist AUVs (Y. T. Tan, M. A. Chitre, et al. 2011). 
 
 
Figure 8.  STARFISH AUV (From Tan 2008, 80) 
1. Hardware Modularity 
The STARFISH AUV has a modular hardware design that allows for adding 
special modular features to the payload to make the specific AUV perform a certain task 
as shown in Figure 9. This modular reconfiguration and integration are primarily 
achieved through a mechanical and electrical interface. The mechanical coupling 
interface uses a male-female interlocking mechanism with locking teeth, as shown in 
Figure 10. As the STARFISH AUV performs based on the concept of a team of AUVs, 
an individual AUV need not have all the sensors required for the mission. This is based 
on the force multiplier effect (as mentioned in Section II.C.2) of having a swarm of 
AUVs that will be able to complete any assigned mission.  
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Figure 9.  STARFISH AUV System Configuration (From Tan 2008, 80) 
 
 
Figure 10.  Male-female (Left-Right) Interlocking Mechanism (From Y. T. Tan, M. A. 
Chitre, et al. 2011) 
2. Software Modularity 
Operation of the STARFISH AUV components is based on Distributed Software 
Architecture Autonomous Vehicles (DSAAV) architecture. The DSAAV has been 
designed from the ground up with modular AUVs in mind, as shown in Figure 11. In a 
DSAAV compliant AUV, each module provides a uniform software interface that other 
AUV modules can access. This interface allows configuration of the module, logging of 
critical information, discovery of services, access to sensor and actuator services, health 
monitoring, and automated software update functionality. The interface is rich in 
functionality, yet lightweight and portable to ensure that even low power micro-
controllers can easily implement it. The DSAAV can be implemented on any underlying 
communication backbone such as Ethernet. The software components running under 
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DSAAV are independent of the underlying communication backbone and function 
without change of various AUVs in different operating environments (Chitre 2008). 
 
 
Figure 11.  STARFISH AUV Software Modularity Configuration (From Chitre 2008) 
The DSAAV has a four-layer architecture (1) IComms, (2) remote procedure call 
(RPC), (3) framework and sensor/actuator service, (4) command and control components 
as shown Figure 12. The bottom layer IComms provides an implementation of a reliable 
messaging service over whatever communications backbone available or chosen for the 
STARFISH AUVs that are teamed up for the particular assigned mission. The next higher 
RPC layer implements a remote procedure call semantic using the IComms messaging 
service. The third layer consists of framework and sensor/actuator services implemented 
using the RPC framework. These include core services for vehicle configuration, logging 
and health monitoring. The layer also includes hardware drivers for all the sensors and 
actuators as well as an external communications interface for communication to other 
vehicles and/or the control center. The top layer houses the command and control 
components which utilize the services provided by lower layers to achieve the mission of 
the vehicle (Chitre 2008). 
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Figure 12.  DSAAV’s 4-layer Architecture (From Y. T. Tan, M. A. Chitre, et al. 2011) 
3. Heterogeneous Multi-assets Deployment 
STARFISH AUVs are designed with the vision of operating within the setup of 
heterogeneous autonomous assets. With modularity and flexibility of reconfiguration 
supported by the open architecture, the STARFISH allows easy adaptations of the vehicle 
to interoperate with other assets. Other assets can also take advantage of its flexible 
architecture. STARFISH AUV can be seamlessly deployed alongside other systems to 
form a set of collaborative assets; a possible configuration is depicted in Figure 13. In this 
configuration, assets with heterogeneous capabilities provide different functionalities to 
the team. For example, surface vessel USV and positioning AUV have provided good 
position fixes. Bottom mounted systems, such as Underwater Networked Pop-Up 
Ambient Noise Data Acquisition (UNet-PANDA), have been shown effective for ranging 
and data relaying, along with survey AUVs for data collection (Y. T. Tan, M. A. Chitre, 
et al. 2011). Many of these assets such as STARFISH AUVs, USV and surface vessel 
have employed variations of hardware and software configurations from the DSAAV 
architecture. This heterogeneous multi-assets deployment is a simple example of the 
possible setup in the perceived slice-of-time scenario. The scenario as suggested by Tan, 
Chitre, et al., is in line with the slice-of-time scenario of integrating many unmanned 





Figure 13.  Homogeneous Multi-assets Deployment (From Y. T. Tan, M. A. Chitre, et al. 
2011) 
4. Cooperative Positioning between Two STARFISH AUVs 
In a scenario where there are limited payloads for field deployment, a 
heterogeneous team of assets that can cooperate with one another would be 
advantageous. The ARL had worked on a team of STARFISH AUVs equipped with 
complementary payloads to accomplish a desired mission objective cooperatively. Two 
STARFISH AUVs, Bluestar and Redstar were configured as beacon (positioning AUV) 
and survey AUV, respectively. Bluestar was equipped with a Doppler Velocity Log 
(DVL) payload to execute its role as a positioning beacon. On the other hand, Redstar 




Figure 14.  Cooperative Positioning with Bluestar and Redstar (From Koay, et al. 2011) 
The AUV architecture has allowed easy adaptation of STARFISH AUVs into 
these complimentary configurations. Specific payloads with appropriate software services 
have been introduced and only adaptation in the position estimate software modules have 




Figure 15.  Cooperative Positioning Results: Mission Path (From Koay, et al. 2011) 
 
Figure 16.  Cooperative Positioning Results: Error of Redstar (From Koay, et al. 2011) 
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Several open-water trials were carried out in coastal waters in Selat Pauh, 
Singapore where Redstar performed surveys in lawn-mover missions using only dead-
reckoning for position estimates and ranging information from BlueStar to improve 
positioning accuracy. The mission path executed by Bluestar and Redstar can be 
observed in Figure 15. The bounded positioning error of Redstar is shown in Figure 16. 
The results clearly exhibited the efficiency of cooperative positioning, where positioning 
errors of a simply equipped AUV without high accuracy positioning capabilities could 
still yield good bounded estimates. 
Cost savings in terms of payload deployment was also achieved. Effectively, the 
required quantity of the DVL and sidescan payloads was reduced by one each as 
compared to equipping every AUV with both DVL and sidescan. The reduced in number 
of sensors needed also increased the operational and logistics efficiencies since there are 
less parts to operate or maintain (Y. T. Tan, M. A. Chitre, et al. 2011). 
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IV. SLICE-OF-TIME SCENARIO 
Chapter II establishes the necessary environmental assumptions used as well as 
develops the slice-of-time scenario. From this baseline scenario, an integrated system of 
manned and unmanned autonomous systems is described in Chapter IV. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE SLICE-OF-TIME SCENARIO  
1. Material Technology Improvement 
The unmanned systems will benefit from the material technology improvement 
that is occurring in manufacturing industries. The nanotube-reinforced carbon fiber 
Piranha USV highlighted in Section II.C.3, gave an example of how the currently 
development of unmanned systems is at the fringe of material technological improvement 
that will provide unmanned systems with sufficient endurance to be properly deployed to 
conduct operations. The greatly increased endurance will drive the possibility of 
unmanned systems being tasked into more operations in the slice-of-time scenario. This 
is similar in idea to the electric vehicle which previously suffered from low endurance 
making it unsuitable to replace a combustion engine vehicle (Roos n.d.), but is seeing a 
gradual replacement with longer endurance models coming into the market such as the 
Nissan Leaf introduced to the United States in 2010 (Nissan 2010). 
2. Prevalent Unmanned Systems 
Examples of the development of unmanned vehicles, starting from the DARPA 
Grand Challenges (described in Section II.C.1), they showed that unmanned systems will 
be operating in manned environments sooner than might have been expected. There will 
be a need for robust C&C architecture to govern the entire integration space. The 
perceived slice-of-time scenario provide an environment in which unmanned systems can 
be prevalent and while working amidst a manned assets. 
3. Swarm of Unmanned Systems 
Unmanned systems will likely be operating in swarms, since the true force 
multiplier effect (described in Section II.C.2) of any unmanned systems is when the 
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unmanned systems can reach a critical mass number that is beyond the capability that can 
be obtained from manned systems. The emergent behaviors of a swarm of unmanned 
systems need to be well identified in this slice-of-time scenario. Similarly, there needs to 
be a for robust C&C architecture that can able to handle not just unmanned systems but 
swarms of unmanned systems in the perceived slice-of-time scenario environment. 
4. Suitable Arsenal for Unmanned Systems 
Unmanned systems operating in swarm will likely be small in size. The 
development of more small size tactical weapons (described in Section II.C.4) will enable 
more unmanned systems to be able to carry out a wider spectrum of operations in the 
perceived slice-of-time scenario. These suitable arsenals will enable more unmanned 
systems to operate in the future. 
B. AUTONOMY 
The understanding of autonomy is important in the slice-of-time scenario and this 
following section will provide further details. 
1. Unmanned and Autonomy 
The difference between the two terms (unmanned and autonomy) makes clear that 
not all unmanned vehicles are autonomous. Autonomy requires a higher level of 
sophistication. This section seeks to clarify the difference of autonomy from unmanned. 
The term “manned” is defined as “Having a crew” and “unmanned” is defined as 
“Lacking a crew” (Lewis 2006–2012). Both terms, manned and unmanned, have been 
quite widely used and have been clear since the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the United States’ civilian space agency, successfully embarked 
on the Apollo Program and completed the manned mission to moon on July 20, 1969 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 2009) and when the Curtiss-
Sperry Aerial Torpedo became the first “unmanned” flying bomb (also known as “Curtis-
Sperry Flying Bomb” on March 6, 1918 as shown in Figure 17. This was the dawn of the 
unmanned aerial vehicle flying (Newcome 2003). 
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Figure 17.  Curtiss/Sperry “Flying Bomb” (From Parsch 2005) 
In general terms, autonomy is defined as “The capacity of a system to make its 
own decisions about its actions” (Lewis 2006–2012). With the development of unmanned 
systems into the realm of autonomy, there was a need for a specific definition. In 2003, 
the Federal Agencies Ad Hoc Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) 
Working Group (WG) defined and collected terminology to support the Group’s main 
objective, the definitions of the unmanned system autonomy levels and the metrics for 
measuring autonomy levels. The ALFUS WG had been able to give a specific definition 
and metrics to define autonomy (Federal Agencies Ad Hoc Autonomy Levels for 
Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Working Group (WG) 2004). The ALFUS WG definitions 
of autonomy are in two parts “(A) The condition or quality of being self-governing; and 
(B) An unmanned system’s A UMS’s own ability of sensing, perceiving, analyzing, 
communicating, planning, decision- making, and acting, to achieve its goals as assigned 
by its human operator(s) through designed human-robot interaction (HRI). Autonomy is 
characterized into levels by factors including mission complexity, environmental 
difficulty, and level of HRI to accomplish the mission” (Huang et al. 2004). 
2. ALFUS Autonomy Framework 
The ALFUS comprehensive framework which provides levels of autonomy that 
can be described. The framework includes the following: 
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 Terms and Definitions: A set of standard terms and definitions that 
support the autonomy level metrics. 
 Detailed Model for Autonomy Levels: A comprehensive and detailed 
specification for determining autonomy. The audience consists of 
technical users of unmanned systems. 
 Summary Model for Autonomy Levels: A concise, scalar presentation of 
autonomy levels. The audience is executives and end users (in the DoD 
domain, these would include combat leadership, program managers, unit 
leaders, and soldiers). 
 Guidelines, Processes, and Use Cases: A process to translate the detailed, 
technical ALFUS model into the summary model as well as guidelines to 
apply the generic framework to specific ALFUS models. A number of use 
cases may be generated to demonstrate the application processes. 
Of these, the most interesting to note for this thesis is the detailed model for 
autonomy levels. The detailed model is a comprehensive set of metrics that represent 
multiple aspects of concerns, including (a) mission complexity, (b) environmental 
difficulty, and (c) level of HRI that, in combination, indicate a unmanned system’s level 
of autonomy. This detailed model is illustrated in Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18.  Three dimensions determining the autonomy level for unmanned systems, 
detailed model (From Huang et al. 2004)  
a. Environmental Difficulty 
The level and measurement for Environmental Difficulty is complex and 
closely intertwined with the other two measures. However, Environmental Difficulty 
should stand out as a separate aspect due mainly to the large variety of Environmental 
Difficulty. This measure is decomposed into categories including, but not limited to: 
 35
Static Environment, Dynamic Environment, Electronic/Electromagnetic Environment, 
Mobility, Mapping and Navigation, Urban Environment, Rural Environment, and 
Operational Environment. This aspect has not been fully explored by ALFUS and will 
need further explorations (Huang et al. 2004). However, a clear takeaway is that the level 
of autonomy will need to be higher for a higher level of Environmental Difficulty. 
b. Mission Complexity 
The detailed model specified and evaluated the autonomy level according 
to the missions and tasks that the unmanned systems are capable of performing. The more 
complex the missions are, the higher the level of autonomy required is. An example is 
that an unmanned system capable of performing a security surveillance task is regarded 
as having a higher level of autonomy than a system that is only able to perform a point-
to-point driving task. 
There are four major categories of metrics for measuring the complexity 
of missions (Huang et al. 2004). They are: 
 Tactical Behavior: The composition and structure of the involved 
tasks provide an essential measure for the complexity of a mission. 
 Coordination and Collaboration: A mission with a higher level of 
complexity typically requires a higher level of coordination and 
collaboration among the components or subsystems. From a 
system perspective, a UMS that is able to perform a high level of 
coordination and collaboration should be regarded as having a high 
level of autonomy. 
 Performance: A UMS’s ability to achieve mission goals with high 
efficiency and accuracy through its planning and execution 
components indicates the UMS’s autonomous capability. 
 Sensory Processing/World Modeling: The perception requirements 
for particular missions and the dependency on external information 
indicate levels of complexity of the missions. 
Additionally, to those that are proposed by Huang, et al., the use of a loss 
function can be a metric that compares performance with normalized loss. Loss can be 
measured as energy, matter, material wealth, and information (Langford, Engineering 
Systems Integration, 2012). 
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c. Human Robot Interaction (HRI) 
The detailed model also stated that the level of Human Robot Interaction 
(HRI) and the autonomy level for an unmanned system have a fairly linear relationship 
for simple systems. The HRI takes into account operator workload, required skill level 
and the ratio of operator to number of unmanned systems the operator controls. These are 
all relevant factors that have an inverse relationship with the autonomy of the unmanned 
systems (Huang et al. 2004). 
3. Situational Awareness 
When considering unmanned systems in a manned environment, it is important to 
take the human factor into account. An important concept within the field of human 
factors, which extends across issues of memory and comprehension, is that of situation 
awareness (Proctor and Zandt 2008). Situational awareness is the knowledge of objects 
and processes with respect to their spatial or temporal relations, as interpreted by a 
particular person, with a defined perspective, within an acknowledged paradigm, through 
the framework of a particular theory, as predicated by a set of principles. Being “aware” 
of a situation is the first step in being able to assess and evaluate the data gathered 
through situational awareness. Becoming situationally aware means knowing what data 
is, how it relates to form various bits of information, and how that information can be 
used in forming cognitive patterns (Langford, Toward a General Theory of Systems 
Integration, 2012). Situational awareness is arguably one of the most critical factors in 
any scenario. Situational awareness is defined as having three levels: (a) perception, (b) 
comprehension, and (c) projection (Bolstad, Costello and Endsley 2006). 
a. Perception 
Level 1 situation awareness, perception, involves the sensory detection of 
significant environmental cues. Perception is an active process whereby individuals 
extract salient cues from their environment. 
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b. Comprehension 
Level 2 situation awareness, comprehension, involves integrating 
information into working memory to understand how that information will impact the 
individual’s goals and objectives. This includes developing a comprehensive picture of 
the world, or of that portion of the world of concern to the individual.  
c. Projection 
Level 3 situation awareness, projection, consists of extrapolating 
information and projecting it forward in time to determine how it will affect future states 
of the operating environment. Level 3 situation awareness combines what the individual 
knows about the current situation with existing mental models or schemata of similar 
events to predict what might happen next. 
As the complexity of environment, mission or Human Robot Interaction 
(described in the Section IV.B.2) increases, so does the cognitive workload required to 
achieve and maintain situation awareness in order to make accurate informed decisions 
(Bolstad, Costello and Endsley 2006). A visual representation of the three levels of 
situation awareness is shown in Figure 19. This figure illustrates the levels of cognitive 
processes that need to take place. The three levels of situation awareness show the heavy 
cognitive workload that an unmanned system will need to accomplish in order for the 
unmanned system to be able to function in a complex manned environment. 
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Figure 19.  Information Processing for Situation Awareness (From Adams, 2007) 
Having good situational awareness allows a human to carry out and 
complete missions. How would situation awareness be replicated in order for unmanned 
systems to perform autonomously? Shared situational awareness is more likely to be the 
characterization. Sharing suggests there is a common basis for communication and 
understanding, but perhaps with some unique identifiers that may be specific to a 
particular platform. These particulars may or may not be shared, but presumably could be 
requested or sent to a central body or distributed throughout a swarm of unmanned 
vehicles. The particulars could become part of the situational awareness if that 
information were found meaningful as part of the requisite knowledge. Current 
unmanned systems have demonstrated basic levels of environmental perception 
capability with the unmanned systems onboard sensors and (the ever increasing amount 
of) computing power. The (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
Legged Squad Support System (LS3) demonstrated two robotic “pack mule” prototypes 
that can sense the rugged environment in which they are located and automate their 
movements to trot over rough, rocky terrain, easily transition to a 5-mph jog shown in 
Figure 20. The increased onboard sensors and computing power also enable the mules to 
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follow a squad leader. This ability of autonomy in terrain crossing while following the 
leader provides a demonstration of autonomy in the making (Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) 2012). This is still basic autonomy (as described in Section 
IV.B.1) and, in order to achieve situational awareness in unmanned machines, the 
challenges to be met are in the areas of comprehension and prediction. The logic 
algorithms in most unmanned systems (e.g., LS3) are highly reactive to their 
environment, without real comprehension of the overall mission goals of the squad. In 
order for the unmanned systems to reach a higher level of automation, (for example the 
next LS3 that will be able to carry out autonomous resupply missions to troops on the 
frontline,) there must be an advance in areas such as artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, and even advance modeling of artificial intelligence operating in a complex 
environment associated with human cognition.  
 
 
Figure 20.  Legged Squad Support System (LS3) (From Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), 2012) 
This discussion of situation awareness leads to a discussion of how situation 
awareness is related in both human (operator or supervisors for the unmanned systems) 
and the unmanned systems. This relationship can be seen across the spectrum of 
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autonomy as introduced by Adam. The common factor is the degree of human interaction 
with the system in the course of the mission. Adams correlated levels of autonomy to 
levels of both system and human SA. Direct human control of the system, i.e., most 
current UVS, would equate to little, if any, machine situation awareness, while fully 
autonomous systems would reduce considerably the level of the need for human situation 
awareness (Adams 2007). The inverse relationship of human situation awareness (from 
the left) and unmanned system situation awareness (from the right) across the spectrum 
of increasing autonomy is shown in Figure 21.  
 
 
Figure 21.  Allocation of Human and Unmanned System Situation Awareness across the 
Different Levels of Autonomy” (From Adam 2007) 
Therefore, for the slice-of-time scenario planning of high level autonomy, the 
unmanned systems need to have a high level of situation awareness in order to effectively 
act as reliable collaborators to their human counterparts (in a man-unmanned teaming). 
4. Manned-Unmanned (MUM Teaming) 
In slice-of-time scenario planning, it is perceived that there will be a need for the 
unmanned systems to be continually operating in manned environments. Therefore, there 
is a need to discuss the notion of Manned-Unmanned (MUM Teaming). MUM teaming 
refers to the relationships established between manned and unmanned systems 
(Winnefield and Kendall 2010). The relationship is to form an integrated team of 
personnel engaged in a common mission incorporating both manned and unmanned 
systems. Thus, MUM teaming is the overarching term used to describe platform 
interoperability and shared asset control to achieve a common operational mission 
objective. Interoperability is the action of two or more systems or components as they 
interact and use the information that has been exchanged (Langford, Engineering Systems 
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Integration,  2012). This capability is vital for missions such as target cueing and handoff 
between manned and unmanned systems, where the operators require a high degree of 
geospatial fidelity to accurately depict each team member’s location with regard to the 
object being monitored. It is perceived in the slice-of-time scenario planning that this 
fidelity will be achieved digitally through accurate data transfer, and there will be no 
need for any voice hand-over (Rider 2004). 
In the United State Army, MUM teaming was also demonstrated by the follow-on 
Hunter Standoff Killer Team in 2006. During that demonstration, an AH-64D Apache 
helicopter executed a high level of interoperability control of a RQ-5B Hunter unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) during a live fire exercise where the Apaches launched their own 
Hellfire missiles with the Hunter’s sensor payload (IHS 2005). At these demonstrations, 
the Army Aviation Applied Technology Directorate successfully integrated a Mobile 
Commander’s Associate (Defense Update 2005), including Link 16, and other data links, 
into an Army airborne C2 system. This integration enabled an airborne C2 system 
operator, located in a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, to control a Hunter UAV and its 
sensor, for the first time. The operator was also able to send and receive tactical 
information in flight between strike aircraft such as the FA-18, and reconnaissance 
aircraft such as JSTARS (Colucci 2004). These demonstrations have continued to support 
that slice-of-time scenario planning will have high level of MUM teaming (Winnefield 
and Kendall 2010). 
5. Command and Control (C&C) of Multiple Unmanned System (One-
to-Many) 
In slice-of-time scenario planning, it is thought there will be a need for the 
unmanned systems to be controlled or supervised by the one user (one-to-many) C&C 
concept. It is expected that the user will be required to remotely communicate and control 
multiple unmanned systems since the unmanned systems alert and report situations will 
be beyond unmanned system autonomy and therefore require human interaction. It is 
further perceived there will be two forms of control in this slice-of-time scenario 
planning. As earlier discussed (Section IV.B.2.c) there will be limited human situation 
awareness in the high autonomy environment as illustrated in Figure 21. (Adams 2007) In 
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the slice-of-time-scenario, the forms of control need to be simple so that the human can 
conduct a one-to-many control. This thesis suggests that the C&C will take in the 
following two forms: (a) consent or (b) exception.  
a. Consent C&C 
In Consent C&C, the unmanned systems ask for user permission before 
starting an action. There is the worry about latency in this mode of C&C, but it will be 
used when the actions have high consequences and will require a human in the loop to 
make the executive decision. With unmanned systems operating with high autonomy, the 
unmanned systems will free up the user from having to control and execute all the action. 
With these high autonomy unmanned systems, the user will have more cognitive capacity 
to think critically and make necessary decisions. An example of these executive decisions 
is a “permission to destroy the target” request. This will occur while the unmanned 
systems are operated together in the same operating environment, and communicating 
and controlling their own actions in relation to other unmanned as well as manned 
systems. In slice-of-time scenario planning, it is likely there will be a high density of 
unmanned systems operating together and there is a need to plan for this happening. This 
is in line with the perceived idea of unmanned systems in the slice-of-time scenario 
operating in swarms to take advantage of the true force multiplier effect (in Section 
II.C.2) 
b. Exception C&C 
In Exception C&C, the unmanned systems will continue to carry out all 
their actions unless the user removes permission. An example of employing this 
capability in the future would be the ability to conduct mine clearance operations within a 
hostile environment. Mine clearance can be a monotonous (Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) n.d.) and dangerous task well suited for unmanned 
systems that are not affected by monotony. An example in the slice-of-time scenario 
planning is a group of unmanned systems and unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs) 
carrying out tasks for a mission managed by a single mission human controller. The 
mission controller will establish the required mine clearance area for the group of UUVs. 
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The expectation of the controller is the UUVs will carry out their actions to accomplish 
the mission without the need to request permission to dispose of any mines found, as long 
as the situation is within the pre-cleared boundaries. These boundaries include physical 
boundaries that delimit the geographic area in which the mine-clearing operations are to 
be carried out, the functional boundaries by which interactions between the UUVs or the 
mines are contained, and the behavioral boundaries that determine how stakeholders will 
act according to the mine clearing operations and the consequences therefrom. If a UUV 
discovered a mine outside the approved boundary, (an example is the detection of the 
mine near an uncharted wreck,) the UUV is expected to report and wait for further 
instructions from the controller. Such high levels of autonomy and robust one-to-many 
C&C operations are deemed to be highly effective in the perceived slice-of-time scenario 
planning. 
C. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) ACQUISITION 
PROCESS  
The acquisition process for major defense systems is shown in Figure 22. The 
process is defined by a series of phases during which technology is characterized and 
matured into viable concepts, which are subsequently developed and readied for 
production, after which the systems produced are supported in the field (Department of 
Defense (DoD) 2012). The process allows for a given system to enter the set of activities 
at any of the developmental phases. For example, a system using unproven technology 
might enter at the beginning stages of the process and then proceed through a period of 
technology maturation; while a system based on mature and proven technologies might 
enter directly into engineering development, or conceivably, even production. There are 
four phases of development: (1) Concept and Technology Development, (2) System 
Development and Demonstration, (3) Production and Deployment and (4) Sustainment 
and Disposal (Department of Defense (DoD) 2012). 
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Figure 22.  United States DoD Acquisition Process (From Department of Defense (DoD) 
2012) 
1. Concept and Technology Development 
The first stage in the DoD acquisition process, Concept and Technology 
Development, is intended to explore alternative concepts based on assessments of 
operational needs, technology readiness, risk, and affordability. Entry into this phase does 
not imply that the DoD has committed to a new acquisition program; rather, it is the 
initiation of a process to determine whether or not a need can be met at reasonable levels 
of technical risk and at affordable costs.  
2. System Development and Demonstration 
The System Development and Demonstration phase could be entered directly as a 
result of a technological opportunity and urgent user need, as well as progressing through 
concept and technology development. The System Development and Demonstration 
phase consists of two stages of development, system integration and system 
demonstration. Depending upon the maturity level of a system, it could enter at either 
stage, or the stages could be combined. This is the phase during which the technologies, 
components and subsystems defined earlier are first integrated at the system level, and 
then demonstrated and tested. If the system has never been integrated into a complete 
system, it will enter this phase at the system integration stage. When subsystems have 
been integrated, prototypes demonstrated, and risks considered acceptable, the program 
will normally enter the system demonstration stage following an interim review by a 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to ensure readiness. The system demonstration 
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stage is intended to show that the system has operational utility consistent with the 
operational requirements. Engineering demonstration models are developed and system 
level development testing and operational assessments are performed to ensure that the 
system performs as required. These demonstrations are to be conducted in environments 
that represent the eventual operational environments intended. Once a system has been 
demonstrated in an operationally relevant environment, it may enter the Production and 
Deployment phase. 
3. Production and Deployment 
The Production and Deployment phase consists of two stages: production 
readiness and low rate initial production (LRIP), and rate production and deployment. 
There exists a possibility that a system could enter directly into this phase if it were 
sufficiently mature, for example, a commercial product to be produced for defense 
applications. However, the entry is made directly or through the maturation process 
described, the production readiness and LRIP stage is where initial operational tests, live 
fire tests, and low rate initial production are conducted. Upon completion of the LRIP 
stage and following a favorable Beyond LRIP test report, the system enters the rate 
production and deployment stage during which the item is produced and deployed to the 
user. As the system is produced and deployed, the final phase, Sustainment and Disposal, 
begins. 
4. Sustainment and Disposal 
The last, and longest phase is Sustainment and Disposal. During this phase all 
necessary activities are accomplished to maintain and sustain the system in the field in 
the most cost-effective manner possible. The scope of activities is broad and includes 
everything from maintenance and supply to safety, health, and environmental 
management. This period may also include transition from contractor to organic support, 
if appropriate. During this phase, modifications and product improvements are usually 
implemented to update and maintain the required levels of operational capability as 
technologies and threat systems evolve. At the end of the system’s service life, the system 
is disposed of in accordance with applicable classified and environmental laws, 
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regulations, and directives. Disposal activities also include recycling, material recovery, 
salvage or reutilization, and disposal of by-products from development and production. 
This thesis focused on the first two phases of Concept and Technology 
Development, and System Development and Demonstration. Using a real life unmanned 
system as a case study, this thesis examined the timeline that the real life unmanned 
system has taken to conduct the Concept and Technology Development, and System 
Development and Demonstration. 
D. ROADMAP FOR INCREASING CAPABILITY 
1. Integrating Capabilities the Traditional Way 
The traditional way of planning for an improvement in capabilities is by taking an 
existing platform with its old capability and integrating a new capability. An example is 
the Lockheed U-2, nicknamed “Dragon Lady,” the single-engine, very high-altitude 
reconnaissance aircraft that has been in service since the 1950s. 
Even in an age of advanced spy satellites, U-2 still fills a crucial niche. 
Satellites and high-fliers like the U-2 or Global Hawk are completely 
complementary systems. Satellites do a fantastic job of quickly monitoring 
the entire globe but can’t always focus on a particular area for a long time. 
High fliers do a great job of monitoring smaller areas for a long time,” 
said Maj. Gen. James Poss, Air Force assistant deputy chief of staff for 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. (Brook 2011). 
New capabilities have been constantly integrated into the old platform. The 
newest U-2 was built in 1989, and all U-2s have been updated with $1.7 billion spent 
since 1994 to retrofit them (Brook 2011). This method of improving capability of an 
existing system is incremental in nature. It has a high level of confidence for success, as 
there is little risk in taking small steps. This is illustrated in Figure 23. There is a gradual 
increase in capability with each new step of capability being integrated or introduced to 
the platform. This is a good systematic method but it can be time consuming. If there is a 
need for additional high capability (illustrated as the shaded ellipse in Figure 23. ), the 
traditional way of planning will still have to take the path illustrated by the dotted line to 
reach the desired state. 
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Figure 23.  A Way of Incremental Increasing of Capability 
The path that is moving up is the direction of “Want.” This is the path that is 
traditionally taken by operators since they are in “the thick of the action” where the 
immediate concern is about today’s war, about getting through the immediate problem. It 
is often this traditional method of responding to an immediate concern, “Want,” that 
creates the incremental path illustrated in Figure 24.  
 
 
Figure 24.  Direction of “Want” 
Want
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However, if there is an envisioned ideal capability state as shown as the shaded 
ellipse in Figure 25. Then, it is possible to plan out a path of “Need.” This path is 
downward while trying to meet current capability. The benefit of this planning is that 
gaps and shortfalls can be identified and remedial actions can be planned in order for 
capability to be improved to reach the desired ideal capability. 
 
 
Figure 25.  Direction of “Need” 
Often, there is an immediate demand for the increased capability, and the question 
is how this will be achieved by traditional planning. One of the solutions is to 
compromise. There will still be a gap that will need to be breached and that will take 
time. If there is no available time, and the demand is great, a technology that has not had 
time for proper integration or testing may be fielded. It is not the perfect solution. 
Another solution may be a technology breakthrough. There may be new technology that 
has matured and will increase capability. For example, a battery using new materials with 
ten times the storage capacity of current lithium batteries at a tenth of the weight allowed 
for an immediate jump in the capability of a micro UAV. The UAVs can now be made 
smaller and fly further than those currently available in the market. Therefore, the 
previous path of capability increase will follow that of the thicker red line shown in 
Figure 26. There will be a sudden surge increase in capability which will shorten the time 





Figure 26.  Effect of Technological Breakthrough 
It is with the understanding of the duality relationship of “Want” and “Need” that 
the working processes and benefits of using the slice-of-time scenario become clear. A 
slice-of-time scenario is set in a future period and the set of conditions comes to fruition 
in the realm in which the slice-of-time exist is actualized. The shareholders will then be 
able to better think and feel that environment. The shareholders will then be able to make 
clearer decisions and have better understanding of the capability gap that exists from the 
current capability level and the one that exists in the slice-of-time. A path can then be 
planned to link current capabilities to reach that level of capability that exists in the slice-
of-time. The slice-of-time scenario exists in the realm that is depicted as double red lines 
in Figure 27. It is also with this reverse look from the slice-of-time scenario to today, by 
which capability gaps can be identified early and resources invested into these identified 
gap areas, to mitigate or overcome the problems. 
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Figure 27.  Realm where Slice-of-time Exists 
2. A Roadmap to Develop Technology 
 
Figure 28.  Roadmap to Develop Technology (After Department of Defense (DoD) 2012) 
This thesis proposed the following steps that a project must follow as shown in 
Figure 28. The steps in further elaborations are as follows: 
1. Proposal of a white paper concept. The concept must be endorsed and 
approved for further effort to be invested. 
2. Proof of concept and model. This is will be done in a laboratory 
environment to systematically test the parts of the white paper concept. 
3. Feasibility study and prototype. This next step will conduct a specific 
feasibility study and to build the prototype to specification in order to conduct 




4. Demonstration. This is normally done in two stages, one in a controlled 
environment, the other in the field environment in which the actual equipment is 
supposed to operate. The demonstration of the prototype’s operation in the actual 
field environment will provide confidence that the product will operate as 
required in the real environment. 
3. A Derived Roadmap for the STARFISH Project 
Based on the information of the report papers (and from earlier Section III.B) that 
the STARFISH project published, a roadmap was devised which explained the 
STARFISH project to demonstrate its autonomous capability in a field environment 
shown in Figure 29. Taking into consideration the above four steps, and the real life 
example of the STARFISH project, a roadmap of integrating unmanned systems to be 
autonomous and operate in a manned environment is suggested. The roadmap took into 
account the technological development of STARFISH (from the time of the published 
papers) and also projected into the near future to see what some of the steps needed to 
achieve the project’s objective will be. It is also assumed that the STARFISH project has 
a design cycle of three years. This is based on the timeline estimating that it will take 
about a year to create the prototype design, a year to build the prototype and a year to test 
and evaluate the design. These cycles are expected to be ongoing until the technology is 
developed sufficiently to produce an actual working model as shown in Figure 30.  
 
 
Figure 29.  Derived Development Roadmap of STARFISH Project from Paper Published 
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Figure 30.  Proposed Roadmap for the STARFISH Project for Future Demonstration 
4. Derived Roadmap 
Therefore, the derived roadmap for integrating Unmanned Systems is in the 
following table: 
Table 1.   Roadmap for Integrating Unmanned Systems 
Step Step Objective Estimated Year Achieved 
Year of Paper 
Reported 
1. Proposing a white paper concept.  1990s Unknown date 
2. Proof on concept and model. 1990s Unknown date 
3. Feasibility Study and Prototype.  2003–2004 2011. (Y. T. Tan, 
M. A. Chitre, et al. 
2011). 
4. Doppler addition with real-time 
monitoring. 
2007  2012  
5. Autonomous demonstration. 2010 – 2011.  
6. Field demonstrations of tethered 
operations in limited series 
edition, (assuming that all 
2013 – 2014  
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Step Step Objective Estimated Year Achieved 
Year of Paper 
Reported 
previous works are successful). 
7. Field demonstrations of 
autonomous operations in limited 
series edition, (assuming that all 
previous works are successful). 
2016 – 2017  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SLICE-OF-TIME SCENARIO PLANNING 
The slice-of-time-scenario planning highlighted the scenario environment of 
future unmanned systems. The environment was perceived as having the unmanned 
systems be fully autonomous and prevalent in the future landscape. The unmanned 
systems would be operating in swarms as command and control (C&C) architecture 
becomes more robust and should be able to control one-to-many in the future. This thesis 
suggested the framework of exception C&C to reduce latency as well as provide effective 
and efficient control in future unmanned systems. 
B. ROADMAP TO DEVELOP AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
Prior discussion of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition 
Process (described in Section IV.C) gave an understanding of the phases needed to 
develop technology. Based on published information from the report papers of the 
STARFISH project, a roadmap was devised and explained (described in Section IV.D.2), 
that will enable the STARFISH project to demonstrate its autonomous capability in a 
field environment. The derived roadmap can be used as a guide to implement the full 
autonomy of unmanned systems and have the unmanned systems integrated in the 
manned environment. 
C. FUTURE WORKS: 
This thesis highlighted that to achieve situation awareness in unmanned machines, 
the challenges to be met are in the areas of comprehension and prediction. To 
comprehend and predict, situational awareness needs to have an explicitly stated theory 
and framework for evaluation. This thesis had assumed that theory and framework are 
present and did not examine these further. One of the potential future works would be to 
look into the lack of theory and framework for context and evaluation, which is a fault 
that must be corrected for autonomous operations to become effective. 
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